A Pure Characteristics Demand Model for Automobile Variants by Thomassen, Oyvind




This paper suggests a way to estimate a structural demand model
for differentiated products using a single cross section of product-
level data. Bajari and Benkard (2005) use revealed-preference bounds
for the taste coefficients. In order to obtain point estimates, I modify
their model in two ways. First, I impose additional bounds on the
willingness to pay for characteristics, based on the price consumers
actually paid for the product they purchased. Secondly, I make an
assumption about the distribution of taste coefficients within the bounds
for each product. I estimate the model with data on new car sales in
Norway.
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I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate, via an empirical example, how
to obtain point estimates of price elasticities in a differentiated products
market using a single cross section of product-level data. I estimate the
model using data on sales of new car model variants in Norway in 2004.
The paper estimates a structural model of the demand for automobiles
based on Bajari and Benkard (2005). Their model produces bounds on
price elasticities. In order to obtain point estimates of elasticities I modify
their model by imposing weak and a priori reasonable bounds on con-
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sumers’ willingness to pay for a characteristic as a percentage of the
price of the product they purchased. As in the random-coefficients logit
literature (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995); Nevo (2001)) utility is linear
in product characteristics and tastes for characteristics have a distribu-
tion in the population of consumers. The main difference from this lit-
erature is that consumers do not have an idiosyncratic taste for products
(like the logit term) that is unrelated to observable characteristics.
A first stage estimates a scalar unobservable product characteristic
for each alternative. A second stage finds the sets of coefficients that
can rationalise the choice of each product. Under utility maximisation,
the choice of a given alternative implies that this alternative’s utility is
greater than those of all the other alternatives. These inequalities imply
bounds on the combinations of taste coefficients a consumer could pos-
sibly have, given his choice. In principle, as the number of products goes
to infinity, the sets of implied taste coefficients for each product should
become singletons. However, in practice, only bounds for each alternative
are implied by the data. Bajari and Benkard (2005) proceed to aggregate
the bounds derived from individual choices to get bounds on the aggre-
gate taste distributions.
Any product which has less of a given characteristic than the con-
sumer’s chosen product provides a lower bound on that consumer’s taste
for the characteristic (conditional on his tastes for the other character-
istics). Vice versa, any product with more of the characteristic provides
an upper bound on the consumer’s taste. Some characteristics take on
only a few discrete values, and in many cases only two: a 0 or 1. For
instance a car either has automatic or manual transmission. For dummy
(binary) variables we obtain either only lower bounds (if the chosen
product has a 1) or only upper bounds (if 0). This means that the set
of taste coefficients will not be bounded.
This problem can be mitigated by imposing conservative bounds on
the distributions of tastes. I propose to use bounds on the willingness-
to-pay for characteristics, expressed as a percentage of the price paid for
the product actually chosen. This provides a way of choosing conservative
bounds that are economically meaningful, and which vary with prefer-
ences.
The next section describes the Norwegian car market and the data
used for estimation. The third section discusses relevant aspects of the
literature, particularly the vertical differentiation model and issues re-
lating to idiosyncratic taste shocks. The fourth section sets out the model
and discusses identification. The fifth section explains the estimation
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procedure. The sixth section presents and discusses the results.
II. Background and Data
A. The Norwegian car market
This paper focuses on the market for new cars in Norway. When com-
paring this market to car markets in many other countries, two facts
stand out: (i) the small size of the market, and (ii) the absence of a
domestic car manufacturing industry.
In 2012, about 130,000 new cars were sold in Norway (with a
population of 5.1 million), all of which were imported.1 The five largest
brands by unit sales were Volkswagen, Toyota, Volvo, Ford and Nissan,
with market shares in the range of 6-13%.
Although a much larger country, South Korea (with 50 million inhab-
itants) is an interesting comparison, because it is at the opposite end of
the spectrum in terms of the role of domestic car manufacturing. In
South Korea in 2012, imported cars were less than 10% of total domestic
car sales of about 1.4 million. In fact, the number of imported cars in
that year was almost exactly the same as in Norway at 130,000.2
B. Data
For reasons of availability, the econometric analysis in this paper uses
data from 2004. The data contain sales and product characteristics for
all the 904 new car model variants sold in Norway in 2004.
Previous studies of the demand for cars have usually treated a model
(“name plate”) as one product, and have used the characteristics of the
cheapest or most sold (“baseline”) variant as the characteristics of the
model (Berry Levinsohn and Pakes 1995). In fact, most models are mar-
keted with a large number of different variants, varying in body type,
engine size, transmission, or fuel type. Table 1 shows the 21 best-selling
models (arranged by price), some characteristics of the modal variant of
each of these models, along with the mean, minimum and maximum of
the characteristics across variants of this model. It also shows the num-
1 Information Council for Road Traffic, ofv.no.
2 Korea Automobile Importers and Distributors Association, Available at: http://
www.kaida.co.kr/brand/BrandMain.jsp?pageId=2&articleId=45892. The South
Korean car industry produces mainly for export, however: around 60% of produc-
tion is shipped abroad.
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ber of variants of the model, total sales of the model, sales of the best-
selling variant, as well as the model’s rank in total sales. Table 2 does
the same for a range of models chosen to represent the whole spectrum
of car models, from the most expensive sports car through family cars
to the smallest hatchback. Prices are list prices. List prices might differ
from transaction prices, but these are not available apart from in smaller
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surveys which cover only a few products. Also, car importers in Norway
usually have a policy of resale price maintenance which limits the de-
viations from list prices. The tables include the unobserved characteristic
which is estimated in a first stage. This will be discussed in the next
section.
Table 3 shows the 30 characteristics used for estimation, along with
their mean across all products, the sales-weighted mean, and the min-
imum and maximum. It also shows the imposed bounds on the will-
ingness to pay for one unit more of the characteristic. These bounds
are discussed in subsection IV.E.
III. Literature
This section reviews parts of the literature on estimation of demand
systems for differentiated products. The model in this paper can be
viewed as a multidimensional extension of the vertical differentiation
model of Bresnahan (1987). I therefore give an overview of that model
before I summarise a recent discussion about the idiosyncratic (e.g. logit)
taste terms in discrete-choice models.
A. Bresnahan’s model of vertical differentiation
Bresnahan (1987) estimates car demand using a vertical differentiation
model like those in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Shaked and Sutton
(1982). In this model a consumer’s utility is
= ,ij j i ju x pb - (1)
where the characteristic, xj, is a scalar representing “quality.”3 The taste
parameter b has an estimated density on a nonnegative support, so that
all consumers have a positive marginal valuation of the characteristic.
Consumers make different choices because they have different valuations
of the characteristic relative to price.
Utility for each product can be pictured as a linear function of b ,
where －pj is the intercept with the vertical axis, and xj is the gradient.
Each consumer is located somewhere on the horizontal axis, and chooses
the product with the utility line that is highest at this b-value. For all
3 Quality is an estimated function of characteristics. The important thing in
this context is that quality is the same for all consumers.
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products to have positive demand, it must be the case that if one product
has strictly lower quality than another, it also has a strictly lower price.
It follows that the utility lines are ordered in a pattern where the lowest-
quality product has the highest-lying line close to the vertical axis, be-
cause it has the highest vertical intercept (lowest price). At some point,
this line is crossed by the product which is above it in the quality
ranking (steeper slope). For high enough bs, this line is superseded by
the third-lowest quality product, and so on. In general, the point where
the utility lines for products j and j＋1 cross is given by
1, 1
1









If products are indexed in order of increasing quality, product j’s market
share is
, 1 1,( ) ( ),j j j jF Fb bb b
+ -- (3)
where Fb is the cumulative distribution function of b , or the distribution
of willingness to pay for quality in the population of consumers.
Bresnahan assumes a uniform density for b . Demand for a product
is then proportional to the length of the interval on the horizontal axis
where this product’s utility line is the highest:
1 1, 1 1,
1 1
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(4)
where d is the (constant) density function. The cross-price and own-price
demand derivatives are (d/(xj＋1－xj)) and －(d/(xj＋1－xj))－(d/(xj－xj－1)), so
the more similar the products are in terms of quality, the higher the
price elasticities. Graphically, price substitution happens in the following
way: When the price of a product goes up, its utility line shifts down,
since the vertical intercept, －p, is lower. This means that the point
where it rises above the utility of the lower-quality neighbour is shifted
outwards, and the point where it is superseded by its higher-quality
neighbour is shifted inwards, shrinking the interval where it is above
the other lines.
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B. Idiosyncratic tastes
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) point out that including idiosyncratic error
terms (as in a logit model) in utility is equivalent to including a dummy
for every product, and imposing draws from the chosen distribution4 as
the coefficients on these dummy variables. This implies that the intro-
duction of a new product adds one dimension to unobserved character-
istics space. Since the expected difference between the logit term of any
two products is the same regardless of the number of products, there is
no congestion in unobserved characteristics space (Ackerberg and Rysman
2005). This is counterintuitive in the sense that one would expect pro-
ducts to become closer as their number increases, as in a Hotelling
model. Congestion does occur in the observed part of characteristics
space, but the additional dimension of unobserved characteristics space
allows every new product to be differentiated in a new way. The lack of
congestion appears to overestimate the benefit of variety to consumers
(Petrin 2002). One would expect that as the number of products goes to
infinity, every product should have a perfect substitute, i.e. that every
consumer could substitute to some other product with zero utility loss.
Bajari and Benkard (2003) show that in any logit model such utility
losses are bounded away from zero in the limit.
Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) propose to let the distribution of the
idiosyncratic term change with the number of products in the choice
set, to allow for congestion of product space. Berry and Pakes (2007) do
away with the idiosyncratic term altogether, giving rise to a pure char-
acteristics model. In this paper I estimate a model based on the pure
characteristics model of Bajari and Benkard (2005). That model will be
discussed in detail in the next section. Blow, Browning, and Crawford
(2008) estimate a nonparametric characteristics-based demand model for
milk.
IV. Model and Identification
A. The model
There are J products defined as bundles of K characteristics (xj, x j),
where xj∈R
K－1 is observed, and x j∈R is not observed by the researcher.
The unobserved characteristic represents such things as style, quality
and service, collapsed into a scalar value. Each consumer chooses one
4 Type 1 extreme value in the case of the logit model.
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product. This is the product which maximises his or her utility over the
set of all products. Utility is a linear function of the product character-
istics and price. The fact that consumers choose different products is
only due to differences in their willingness to pay for characteristics.
The final goal of the analysis is to estimate the joint distribution of the
taste coefficients, i.e. the linear coefficients in the utility function.
A consumer’s ranking of alternatives is unaffected by the scale of
utility. Utility can therefore be multiplied by an individual-specific con-
stant without changing the consumer’s utility-maximising choice. The
following normalisation is therefore permitted: all price coefficients are
set to －1 (multiply by individual-specific constant, the inverse of the
price coefficient).5 Utility is then given by
= ,ij j i ju x pb - (5)
where i indexes individuals and j indexes products. For simplicity of
notation, the vector xj includes the unobserved characteristic as well as
all the other characteristics.
B. The hedonic price function
Using the assumption that utility is strictly increasing in the unob-
served characteristic x for all products and for all consumers (and two
mild regularity conditions), Bajari and Benkard (2005) show that for
any two products j and j’ with strictly positive demand, it must be true
that
1. If xj＝xj’ and x j＝x j’, then pj＝pj’.
2. If xj＝xj’ and x j＞x j’, then pj＞pj’.
3. |pj－pj’|≤M(|xj－xj’|＋|x j－x j’|) for some M＜∞.
Using these properties, we can define a mapping from observed and
unobserved characteristics to price. Because of 1 the mapping is a func-
tion, since a point in the domain of the mapping maps to a unique
point in its image set. Because of 2 the mapping is strictly increasing in
the unobserved characteristic. Because of 3 the mapping defines a
(Lipschitz) continuous surface. The price surface is denoted p(x, x ). In a
5 In logit and probit models this normalization is achieved by fixing the variance
of the error term.
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logit demand model, such a surface does not necessarily exist, since
two products with the same characteristics and different price can both
have strictly positive demand, because of the idiosyncratic taste term.
The price function depends on the nature of competition, marginal costs,
consumer preferences, and the products present in the market. If any
of these primitives change, the shape of the price surface is also likely
to change. The price function expresses the relationship between prices
and characteristics in equilibrium in a particular market. See Bajari
and Benkard (2005) pp. 1247-8 for a discussion of the price function.
　　　
C. Identification of the unobserved characteristic
The assumption used for identification is that the unobserved charac-
teristic is independent of the observed characteristics.6 The unobserved
characteristic has no inherent units, and so it is only identified up to a
monotonic transformation. It is therefore normalised so the marginal
distribution of x is U(0, 1). Bajari and Benkard (2005) use an identi-
fication result from (Matzkin 2003): {x j}j＝1,...,J is identified when the
prices of many products are observed in a market, so that the joint
distribution F(p, x) is known. The proof is:
| = ( ) = ( ( , ) | = )p x x j j jjF p Pr p x p x xx £
1= ( ( , )| = )j jPr p x p x xx
-£
1= ( ( , ))j jPr p x px
-£ (6)







The second line holds since the price function has an inverse for a
given x since it is strictly increasing and continuous in x. The third line
holds by the independence between x and x. The fourth line holds
because the q-quantile of U(0, 1) equals q.
　　　
D. Identification of the taste coefficients
In the second stage, the unobserved characteristic recovered in the
first stage is given, and treated in the same way as the observed char-
6 This assumption is slightly stronger than the mean independence assumption
in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Manski (1994) discusses alternative
moment conditions.
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acteristics. For notational convenience, it is therefore included as one of
the elements of the x-vector. For product j to maximise utility, it must
be the case that
, .j j l lx p x p l jb b- ³ - " ¹ (7)
Let X̃j be the (J－1)×K-matrix whose rows are the (1×K )-vectors xj－xl,
l＝1, ..., j－1, j＋1, ..., J, and let p̃j be the j－1 vector with elements
pj－pl, running over the same indices as X̃j. Then the condition that
product j maximises utility can be written as a system of linear
inequalities on standard matrix form. The set of taste coefficients
permitted by the revealed preference condition (7) for product j is
{ | }.j j jA X pb bº £% % (8)
This means that if a consumer chooses product j, his or her vector of
taste coefficients must be inside the K-dimensional convex polyhedron
Aj. The market share of a product is the share of the population with
taste vectors falling within the polyhedron corresponding to that product.
　　　
E. Bounds on willingness to pay
For a given characteristic, such as horsepower, the revealed preference
inequalities in (7) imply no upper bound on the coefficient for those con-
sumers who buy the product with the highest value of that characteristic.
In the same way, there is no lower bound for the consumers buying the
product with the lowest value of a characteristic.
This problem is limited in the case of continuous characteristics, since
there will usually be only one product attaining the maximum (and one
attaining the minimum) for each characteristic. For indicator variables
(‘has a diesel engine’), however, all products are either the maximum or
minimum of that characteristic. This means that none of the A-sets
(sets of coefficients that rationalise a given choice) will be bounded.
Leaving the coefficient for some characteristics unbounded also has re-
percussions in the sense that an extremely high value for one charac-
teristic often must be matched by an extreme value of another charac-
teristic in order for the product to be the utility maximiser.
To deal with this problem I impose conservative bounds on the
coefficients. Since the price coefficient is normalised to －1, the coef-
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ficients of the characteristics have the convenient interpretation of
willingness-to-pay for a one unit increase in the value of that charac-
teristic. Accordingly, the bounds are formulated as bounds on the will-
ingness to pay for characteristics, given as a percentage of the price of
the product in question. (The bounds are shown in Table 3.) For example,
a consumer’s willingness to pay for an additional litre of cylinder volume
is bounded above by 100% of the price of the car that the consumer
actually bought. So if a consumer buys a car that costs 300.000 kroner
(appr. $ 50,000), it is assumed that his willingness to pay for an add-
itional 1 litre of cylinder volume on a car is bounded above by 300.000
kroner. For some characteristics it is assumed that willingness-to-pay is
bounded below by zero, i.e. that nobody would pay a positive amount of
money to have less of these characteristics. On the other hand, this
possibility is allowed for many characteristics. For instance, if somebody
does not like German cars, he or she may be willing to pay a little extra
to have a car which is not German. The constraints are meant to be
conservative, and it appears unlikely that they should be violated by
the true distribution of taste coefficients.
　　　
F. Distribution of tastes within the bounds
While the revealed-preference inequalities provide bounds (the A poly-
hedra) on the taste coefficients of the consumers who choose each pro-
duct, they tell us nothing about the distribution of tastes within these
bounds. When the number of products goes to infinity in such a way
that the A-sets are partitioned ever more finely, in the limit these sets
will be points (see Bajari and Benkard (2005) for a proof). Accordingly it
can be expected that with a large number of products, the distribution
of probability mass inside these sets will not be important. I impose the
assumption that the distribution of consumer tastes within each set Aj
is uniform. (See section V.B for further details.)
V. Estimation
A. First stage
The unobserved characteristic is given in (6) as a quantile of a con-
ditional distribution: Fp|x＝xj (pj). The nonparametric estimation of condi-
tional distribution functions and quantiles are well known problems.
Matzkin (2003) suggests the following estimator, based on Nadaraya (1964):
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where k2(․) is a multidimensional kernel, , and h is the
bandwidth.
My data have around 900 products and 30 characteristics. It is difficult
to estimate a quantile of a 30-dimensional density using just 900 data
points. I follow (Bajari and Benkard 2005) in assuming that the price
function is additively separable in most of the characteristics, and then
estimate the nonadditive part nonparametrically after removing the linear
effects of the other variables. The price function is then p(x, x )＝p(x A, x )
＋x Bg ̂, where (x A, x B) is a partitioning of the vector x.7 The g ̂ is the OLS
estimate from the regression
= .A Bj j j jp x x eq g+ + (10)
The price data used for the nonparametric estimation of the unobserved
characteristic are
ˆ= .Bj j jp p x g-% (11)
I used Epanechnikov kernels for the estimator in (9) (see for instance
Martinez and Matinez (2002)):
2
1
3( ) = (1 ), 1 1
4
k y y y- - £ £
(12)
The bandwidths were chosen according to the Epanechnikov bandwidth
rule (see Azzalini (1981)) h＝1.3s ̂n－1/3, where n is the number of obser-
vations and s ̂ is the empirical standard deviation of the data.
　　　
B. Second stage
I use a multi-stage Gibbs sampler to take random draws from the A-
sets. The Gibbs algorithm is a general principle that can be used to draw
7 xA＝(horsepower, cyl.vol., length).
1 1( ) = ( )
u
k u k s ds
-¥ò%
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from a multivariate density f (x) which is difficult to draw from directly,
but whose univariate conditional densities can be drawn from. Take a








(t)), and so on. As the number of iterations gets large, the
distribution of x approaches f (x) (Robert and Casella 2004).
The revealed preference condition for the coefficient of characteristic
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and similarly for the other coefficients. Denote the right hand side of
the inequalities above B(j, l, 1). This means that in general, for the
product j, every other product provides either an upper or a lower
bound on the coefficient values which could lead to the purchase of
product j. The bounds based on willingness-to-pay, as described above,
denoted as b1 and b̅1, provide additional constraints.
The distribution of probability mass inside each A-set is uniform, as
discussed in the previous section.8 Given a starting value, b j
(0), which is
inside Aj, it must be true that
(0) (0)
,1 ,2 , ,1,min ,1,max| , , ( , ),j j j K j jb b b b bK ￿ U (15)
where the parameters of the univariate uniform depends on the con-
ditioned-on betas in the following way:
,1,min ,1 ,1,1= max{ , max{ ( , ,1) | and > }}j j ljb B j l l j x xb ¹ (16)
,1,1,max ,1 ,1= min{ , min{ ( , ,1) | and < }}.jj j lb B j l l j x xb ¹ (17)
8 Even if this assumption were not maintained, random draws under the as-
sumption of a uniform distribution will reveal the support of the random vector
bj, and this support is precisely the set Aj.
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Given the starting value, b j
(0), the algorithm follows the Gibbs procedure
described above, with equations (15-17) describing the conditional dens-
ities that are drawn from at each stage.
The Gibbs sampler is computationally straightforward. The most chal-
lenging part was to find a starting point, i.e. any point satisfying (7).
Bajari and Benkard (2005) report that they used as starting values
coefficients derived from first-order conditions under the assumption
that product space is filled up (so that consumers can pick a product
anywhere in characteristics space). This method did not work for my
data. The only method which turned out to be reliable was to use the
centre of the Chebyshev ball (the largest K-dimensional ball wich can
be fit inside the polyehedron), computed by Komei Fukuda’s cdd9 code,
implemented for Matlab in MPT (Herceg, Kvasnica, Jones, and Morari
2013).
To draw from the full joint distribution of the betas, I use nsj＝1500
draws for each product j. An initial 1500 draws are burn-in draws for
the Gibbs sampler. Each draw from Aj is weighted by the market share
of product j. The simulated market share, used to compute price elas-
ticities, is
=1 =1








where sl is the observed market share of product l, i.e. the proportion of
car buyers whose coefficients are in the set Al. cli denotes the product
which maximises utility given the i-th draw of coefficient vector from Al. l(․)
is the indicator function.
To clarify, when prices and product characteristics are at their
observed values, all nsj draws for product j result in the choice of j, so
that . Substitution effects show up when prices change,
and some of the draws for product j result in the purchase of a different
product, so that . At the same time, draws from a dif-
ferent product could now result in the purchase of product j. (The
draws for product j represent the taste distribution of consumers who
actually purchased product j.)
　　　
9 Komei Fukuda (Available at: http://www.inf.ethz.ch/personal/fukudak/cdd
home/index. html).
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VI. Results
A. The unobserved characteristic
The estimated unobserved characteristic ranges from 0.07 to 0.99 and
has a mean of 0.52. Tables 1 and 2 show the value of the unobservable
for the modal variant of a selection of models, as well as its mean, min-
imum and maximum across variants of each model. The unobserved
characteristic is independent of all other characteristics (not including
price). Generally speaking, a product with a high price relative to its
characteristics will have a high value of the unobserved characteristic,
since high quality, style or prestige is required for it to have positive de-
mand in the presence of other, cheaper products with similar observed
characteristics. This is illustrated by table 4. All Mercedes E-class vari-
ants have high values of the unobserved characteristic. This is consistent
with the perception of Mercedes as a prestigious brand. The Peugeot
607 is a comparable car to the Mercedes E for similar engine sizes. A
comparison reveals that the unobserved characteristic is lower for the
Peugeot for similar specifications, presumably reflecting the higher pres-
tige of the Mercedes. A similar pattern is found by comparing the Audi
A4 with the Skoda Octavia, two similar models where the first is re-
garded as more prestigious than the second.
The low-end Mercedes E variants have extremely high values for the
unobserved characteristic, reflecting some feature which gives them
positive demand in spite of their very high prices relative to observed
characteristics. Each variant is a package of characteristics, and the
prestige derived from a big engine or a German manufacturer goes into
those observed characteristics. The unobserved characteristic can there-
fore not simply be interpreted as prestige or quality, but rather as the
amount of prestige or quality that the car has beyond what is derived
from its observed characteristics. Accordingly, a 5 litre top-of-the-range
Mercedes E is indeed more prestigious than the bottom-of-the-range 1.8
litre version, but it is already clear from its observed characteristics
that it is a high-prestige product. This is not the case with the 1.8 litre
version, however, and the model therefore assigns it a higher unobserved
characteristic. Compared to a 2 litre Peugeot 607 which sells for 365,000
kroner, the 1.8 litre Mercedes must have substantial unobserved merit
in order to warrant its 512,000 kroner price tag.
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UNOBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS FOR SAMPLE MODELS WITH VARIANTS
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TABLE 4
(CONTINUED)





















































































































































The draws generated in the second stage of the estimation are uni-
formly distributed inside the 30-dimensional revealed-preference polyhedra.
Figure 1 shows scatter plots of the joint densities of the taste coeffi-
cients for length and cylinder volume of consumers who buy three dif-
ferent variants of each of the models Audi A4, A6 and A8. The variants
are the bottom-of-the-range, a middle-of-the-range, and the top-of-the-
range variants of each model in terms of price and engine size. The
scatter plots are the projections of points distributed in a 30-dimensional
space onto a 2-dimensional space. This explains why the sets do not
look like polyhedra and the points do not look like they are uniformly
distributed.
Taste coefficients for length and cylinder volume are bounded below
by zero and above by the price of the product the consumer has chosen
(cf. table 3). In the discussion of the bounds I said that they are meant
to be conservative bounds, and that they are unlikely to be violated by
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FIGURE 1
SCATTER PLOTS OF JOINT DENSITIES OF TASTE
COEFFICIENTS FOR SAMPLE PRODUCTS
the true taste distribution in the population. At the same time, the
model is not identified without these bounds. This means that the dis-
tribution of taste coefficient draws generated by the model will be con-
strained by the bounds to varying degrees.
It is clear that in the case of the top A8, the bounds severely restricts
the area within which the draws fall, as points accumulate close to the
upper bounds. Since the biggest A8 faces few or no competitors that
are longer or have a bigger engine, revealed preference does not constrain
the draws upwards. The mid A4, on the other hand, is located in a very
densely occupied area of characteristics space. The large number of close
competitors means that revealed preference provides upper constraints
that are well below the upper bounds on willingness-to-pay.
Comparing the top or mid A4 with the bottom and mid A6 reveals an
interesting pattern. The A4 is smaller than the A6, but otherwise the
two models are similar with respect to design, quality and service. The
different choices of buyers of the A4 and buyers of the A6, should
therefore be due to a large extent to different tastes for length. This is
indeed confirmed. Mid A4 buyers have a similar distribution of taste for
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volume to mid A6 buyers (cylinder volume being the same), but markedly
lower tastes for length. The reason to pay 30.000 kroner to get an A6
instead of a very similar, but slightly shorter A4, is that the willingness-
to-pay for length is high. Some consumers who buy the top A4 have high
willingness-to-pay for cylinder volume, but not for length. Conversely,
bottom A6 buyers care little about engine size, but have a very strong
taste for length. The same pattern is confirmed by comparing the A6
and the A8.
To find the aggregate distribution of taste parameters, the draws for
each of the 904 variants are aggregated, and weighted by the market
share of each car, corresponding to the proportion of consumers repre-
sented by those particular draws. Since probability mass is assumed to
be uniformly distributed inside each taste coefficient polyhedron, the
approximation to the true aggregate taste distribution will be better if
each polyhedron is small in some sense. As discussed in the identifica-
tion section, if the number of products goes to infinity in such a way
that all polyhedra collapse to points, the distribution resulting from the
model will equal the true distribution in the limit. The scatter plots in
Figure 1 give the impression that the polyhedra are relatively large.
However, if one imagines a 30-dimensional rectangle with sides similar
to those formed by the scatter plot of the top A8, this 30-dimensional
rectangle will contain all 904 taste coefficient polyhedra. These polyhedra
are disjoint, and so much smaller than the rectangle which contains
them all. Furthermore, most polyhedra are contained in a much smaller
volume, with a few fringe products like the top Audi A8 having much
larger polyhedra.
Figure 2 shows kernel smoothed graphs of the aggregate marginal
densities of some taste coefficients. Compared to the scatter plots in
Figure 1, where points look almost uniformly distributed, these densities
have much more probability mass concentrated at certain (low) levels.
The products with high sales are concentrated in certain areas of char-
acteristics space. In practice that means that many people have tastes
leading them to prefer products in those areas. For the purposes of this
discussion, that in turn means that draws in those areas are given much
larger (market share) weights. All the marginal densities have peaks re-
latively close to zero. This is most marked in the cases of length and
cylinder volume. These coefficients are well constrained by revealed pref-
erence, because the corresponding characteristics are continuous and
exhibit large variation in the data. The marginal densities for some
dummy variables have less sharp peaks, because their taste coefficients
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FIGURE 2
AGGREGATE (SMOOTHED) MARGINAL
DENSITIES OF SOME TASTE COEFFICIENTS
are not identified as well by the revealed preference bounds.
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) assume independence between
the taste coefficients for different characteristics. Figure 3 shows kernel
smoothed pairwise joint aggregate densities for some taste coefficients.
The graphs exhibit some interesting examples of dependence between
taste parameters that would be ruled out by assuming independence.
First, there is a substantial proportion of the population with a relatively
high taste for both cylinder volume and length, whereas very few people
have high tastes for only one of these characteristics and not the other.
Secondly, there are many consumers with strong preferences for both
four-wheel drive and a SUV body type. This is not surprising, but cer-
tainly not a feature that should be ruled out by distributional assump-
tions. Thirdly, an inverse relationship exists between taste for cylinder
volume and disutility of fuel costs. Again a substantial group of con-
sumers have a very low disutility of fuel costs and at the same time a
very high preference for cylinder volume, whereas hardly anyone has
such high tastes for cylinder volume while at the same time disliking
fuel costs very much. Finally, the perhaps most interesting example shows
that there is a strong inverse relationship between tastes for German
cars and tastes for Japanese or Korean cars. Especially, consumers
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FIGURE 3
AGGREGATE (SMOOTHED) PAIRWISE JOINT DENSITIES OF
SOME TASTE COEFFICIENTS
who have a high willingness to pay for their car being German, get a
high disutility from an Asian car. Also, many consumers who value Asian
cars dislike German cars. These examples seem intuitive, and appear to




Elasticities were computed by finding the numerical derivative of the
simulated market shares given by (18) w.r.t. each product. I did this in
two ways. Under method I consumers face a choice set containing all
variants of every model, leaving them with 904 choices. Derivatives were
computed with finite differences by letting the price increase for all
variants of the relevant model, and then looking at how the joint market
share of all variants of the model changed.10 To turn the derivatives
into elasticities, they where multiplied by the price of the modal (best-
selling) variant, and divided by the original joint market share.
In method II, I removed all variants apart from the modal variant of
10 I increase the prices of all variants of a model rather than one at a time
because I am particularly interested in substitution between models, since this
has been the focus of the literature.
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each model from the choice set, and simulated demands with this new
choice set. I then computed derivatives in the same way as for model I.
The median own price elasticity from method I was -35, and -13 in
method II. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) report own price elas-
ticities that mostly range from -3 to -6. Table 5 shows the own price
elasticities, markups (price minus marginal cost) and markups as a per-
centage of price for the 50 best selling products in the market, computed
using method II and the assumption of a Nash equilibrium in prices,
with profit maximising entities being the 16 car manufacturing companies
which produce the 197 products on the market. The executive/big family
type cars at the top of Table 5 (Mercedes E to Saab 9.5) all have re-
latively high markups, ranging from 19 to 32%. This is consistent with
the observation that these models are in a niche with few competitors
of similar regard. Further down the list markups are generally lower,
consistent with the fact that characteristics space is more crowded in
that area.
In Tables 6-9 each row shows the elasticities for a car with respect to
the price of the cars in each column. Tables 6 and 7 are elasticities
computed with method I, and Tables 8 and 9 are elasticities computed
with method II. In Tables 6 and 8, the models displayed are the ones
used previously to represent the spectrum of choices in the market,
while Tables 7 and 9 display the top selling 21 cars. Products have
been arranged with the most expensive in the top-left corner, and the
cheapest in the bottom-right corner.
The elasticities for the representative sample of cars in Table 6 exhibit
a pattern where cross-price elasticities of cars that are far away from
each other are zero or very low. Accordingly the areas furthest away from
the diagonal mostly mostly consist of zeros. On the diagonal are own-
price elasticities, and broadly speaking, as one moves further away from
the diagonal, one gets to cross elasticities with products that are more
different. In the top left and the bottom right areas of the matrix, the
belt of positive cross elasticities around the diagonal is thin. Since these
extreme areas represent products at the fringes of characteristics space,
they have fewer substitutes. Moving towards the middle of the matrix,
where characteristics space is more densely filled with products, the
belt around the diagonal gets thicker, since products have more sub-
stitutes. Moving away from the diagonal, it is generally true that cross
elasticities gradually get lower, as they represent products that are grad-
ually more different from the product at the diagonal. Cross elasticities
higher than one are normally only found for adjacent or almost adjacent
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products.
In Table 7 the belt around the diagonal is much thicker. The prod-
ucts in this matrix are the best selling cars, and are located at the
centre of characteristics space, which is where they appeal to the largest
number of consumers. These products are therefore closer substitutes
than those in the previous table, which included the models at the
fringes of characteristics space. Accordingly, cross elasticities are positive
for almost all products. It is still true, however, that elasticities are
lower the further away they are from the diagonal.
Overall, the substitution patterns resulting from method I seem very
reasonable, although the magnitudes of the substitution effects are
high. Bajari and Benkard (2005) also find large price elasticities in their
application to demand for personal computers. They suggest that the
result is due to the assumption of perfect information about all products
on the part of consumers, and conclude that this is unlikely to hold
with a choice set containing 700 products. To mitigate this problem they
remove from the choice set any product with a market share of less
than 0.75%. This left them with only 24 products, and median own
price elasticity fell from -100 to -11. In a similar way I remove all but
the modal (bestselling) variants of each model, the choice set becomes
the same as that used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). All models
are still included. The last column of Table 5 shows that the modal
variant usually represents a very large proportion of the total sales of
the model. I also tried to remove all models with market shares of less
than 0.5%, leaving 40 products. This gave a median own price elasticity
of -5, but this market share threshold is of course somewhat arbitrary.
As expected, elasticities are much lower with method II. This also
means that many more cross elasticities are zero. In Table 8, the belt of
positive cross elasticities around the diagonal is much narrower than in
Table 6. Removing all but the modal variant of each model removes a
model from areas of characteristics space which it does in fact cover,
but which are not covered by the modal variant. In these areas of char-
acteristics space it may be close neighbours with other models whose
modal variants are quite different from its own modal variant. In this
way, products which are in fact substitutes in variant-space (which is
what the consumer faces) are not in model-space. The general features
of the substitution patterns remain unchanged when moving from method
I to method II.
In table 8, products in the middle of the matrix have more substi-
tutes than the ones on the fringes, and the high selling products in
A PURE CHARACTERISTICS DEMAND MODEL 217
Make Model ltr m pri Bodytype





















































































































































































































































CLOSEST SUBSTITUTES FOR FOUR SAMPLE PRODUCTS, COMPUTED USING
HIGHEST CROSS-ELASTICITIES W.R.T. THE SAMPLE PRODUCTS, WHEN
CHOICE SET HAS MODAL VARIANT ONLY
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS218
Make Model ltr m pri Bodytype





















































































































































































































































CLOSEST SUBSTITUTES FOR FOUR SAMPLE PRODUCTS, COMPUTED USING
HIGHEST CROSS-ELASTICITIES W.R.T. THE SAMPLE PRODUCTS, WHEN
CHOICE SET HAS ALL VARIANTS
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Table 9 have many more substitutes than the ones in Table 8. The
size of the elasticities is now much more reasonable, with all but three
of the own elasticities being single digit for the top selling products. It
appears that low market share products are more likely to have par-
ticularly large elasticities, such as the Mercedes S-class in Table 8, with
-51. This is possibly because revealed preference conditions constrain
taste parameters less for special (low market share) products than for
products in the more densely populated parts of characteristics space,
leading to bad estimates of these consumers’ preferences. For the higher-
selling products, elasticities largely appear reasonable. Some examples
of seemingly reasonable high cross elasticities between similar products
are the two SUVs, Range Rover and VW Touareg (1.28 and 0.34) or
Ford Mondeo and VW Passat (0.96 and 3.04).
Table 10 shows the ten best substitutes for four randomly chosen high-
selling products in a densely populated area of characteristics space.
The substitutes are ranked according to their elasticities with respect to
the price of the sample car. (I also tried to rank substitutes using de-
rivatives or displacement ratios, but this did not make much of a dif-
ference.) To the left are best substitutes for one-variant case and to the
right is the many-variants case. The number of substitutes that are com-
mon to the two cases is 6 out of 10 for the VW Golf, 5 for the Toyota
Avensis, 3 for the Ford Focus, and 2 for the Audi A4. As expected, the
inclusion of all variants appears to make a difference.
D. Discussion
The method of this paper could be useful for other markets where
consumers face a large number of alternatives, such as housing. See
Hong (2013) and Cho and Kim (2013) for other approaches.
The data used in this paper are of a particularly simple form: one cross
section, where the unit of observation is a product, and no consumer-
level information. It is therefore natural to ask what use could be made
of more detailed data, such as several time periods or markets, and/or
demographic information such as age, sex or income of consumers.
The method used in this paper can easily be adapted to obtain esti-
mates of taste distributions in separate demographic groups, by simply
replacing the market shares in equation (18) with the corresponding
within-demographic-group market shares. In combination with the ex-
tensions for multiple time periods discussed below, this approach could
be valuable for out-of-sample prediction exercises where demographics
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vary.
Data from multiple markets or time periods could potentially be used
to tighten the bounds obtained in this paper, or to obtain information
about the distribution of tastes within each A-set (the set of taste vectors
which would rationalise the purchase of a given product).
If we consider the revealed preference conditions given in equation
(7), it might be tempting to simply add to the system inequalities from
multiple years of data. Such a straightforward approach is not consistent,
however. Since the set of alternatives available presumably varies between
years, the revealed preference inequalities for two different years are not
statements about the same group of consumers. In principle, the set of
taste vectors simultaneously satisfying the revealed preference conditions
for two different years could even be empty.11
A more promising approach is to estimate the distribution of consumer
tastes in each year separately, as done in this paper, and then pool all
the draws obtained, and use the resulting distribution as the estimated
distribution of tastes, assuming that tastes in the population are constant
across the years. The drawback is that we would not get a perfect fit to
the data in any given year. The advantage, presumably, would be a
better ability to predict out of sample.
VII. Conclusion
I estimate a modified version of a model developed in Bajari and
Benkard (2005). The model has several advantages over the standard
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (BLP) model. It can be estimated with
data from one time period and one market, unlike BLP which requires
many markets for identification. It can also accommodate products with
a larger number of characteristics than what is possible in BLP. I used
30. BLP assumes that taste coefficients are independently normally dis-
tributed. The Bajari-Benkard model makes no parametric assumptions
on the taste distributions, and allows for dependence between the dis-
tributions. In BLP, simulation error becomes a problem when the number
of products is very large (Berry, Linton, and Pakes 2004). In the Bajari-
Benkard model, a large number of products is an advantage for the
estimation of taste distributions.
(Received 10 September 2013; Revised 10 December 2013; Accepted 14
December 2013)
11 An example showing this can easily be constructed for the simple vertical
differentiation model set out in subsection III.A.
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